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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
JORDAN VANCE CALLIHAM, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Appeal No. 20000391 
District No. 9917-00142 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE RULE 3 because the sentencing of Jordan Vance Calliham ("Jordan"), entered on 
March 16,2000, is considered the final decision of the District Court. See UTAH CODE ANN. 
§78~2A-3 (2)(E). 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on April 17, 2000, within 30 days of the entry of 
judgment. Thus, pursuant to UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE RULE 4(E), this appeal is 
timely. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for appeal are as follows: 
1. Did the District Court have jurisdiction to try a juvenile when the matter was not 
certified from juvenile court and the crime was not a direct-filing crime? Appellant asks this 
Court to review the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction over this case under a plain error 
standard because this error was obvious and harmful. See State v Perez. 946 P.2d 724, 732 
(UtahApp. 1997). 
2. Did the trial court err in permitting prospective jurors to continue serving after it 
was discovered that they were acquainted with one or more witnesses, had relatives in law 
enforcement, and had other relationships with attorneys or parties in the case*? The question of 
whether a trial court erred in failing to dismiss a juror for cause is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. See State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170,174 (Utah 1992); State v. Leleae. 993 
P.2d 232,239 (Utah App. 1999). 
3. Did the numerous and substantive portions missing from the trial transcript make 
meaningful appellate review impossible, thus requiring a new triaP This Court has the 
prerogative to notice plain errors on the face of the record. £ge State v. Menzies. 845 P.2d 220, 
225 (Utah 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Jordan appeals from his conviction, following a jury trial, of Assault of a Prisoner, a third 
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN, §§ 76-5-102,76-5-102.5 (1998). Jordan was a 
seventeen (17) year old minor at the time of the alleged assault. He was an inmate at the San 
Juan County Jail. 
On October 7,1999, Jordan was charged by Information with Assault of a Prisoner, a 
third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-102,76-5-102.5 (1998). Jordan 
stood trial by a jury on March 14,2000, and was found guilty of the above mentioned charge, 
Jordan was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term of not more than five (5) years on 
March 16,2000. The Notice of Appeal was timely filed on April 17,2000, 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 30,1999, Appellant, Jordan Vance Calliham allegedly assaulted another 
inmate at the San Juan County Jail while awaiting trial on another matter. (Tr. at pp. 58,62) At 
the time of the alleged assault, Jordan was seventeen (17) years old. The charge was brought by 
criminal information filed directly in the District Court. (R0001) with no certification or other 
such hearing being held before any juvenile court. Jordan was not treated as a serious youth 
offender pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3A-602, because the offense charged was not one of 
the listed offenses in said statute. 
During jury selection, counsel for Jordan requested through counsel that four prospective 
jurors be excused for cause which the trial court denied. (Tr. at p. 48). Prospective jurors 
Whitehat, Bradford, Lee, and Black had relationships with people involved in law enforcement. 
(Tr. at p. 48). Because one of the State's witnesses was a law enforcement officer, the partiality 
of these prospective jurors was brought into question. (Tr. at p. 58) None of these particular 
potential jurors ended up sitting on the jury. (Tr. at p. 49); however, other jurors who sat on the 
jury at trial were partial because they had read local newspapers and were likely aware of 
Jordan's prior conviction for another crime. (Tr. at pp. 32,45). 
Jordan's entire trial, including jury selection, took less than one day. The portion of the 
Transcript dealing with jury selection consists of approximately forty-eight (48) pages. (Tr. at 
pp. 2-49). In those forty-eight (48) pages, there are approximately one hundred and thirty-three 
(133) notations of "inaudible" in the Transcript. Id. The vast majority of these "inaudible" 
responses are from prospective jurors. IJL At least twenty-five (25) inaudible responses are from 
3 
prospective jurors whose impartiality had been brought into question by their previous answers 
which are on the record Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The most fundamental error in this case is jurisdictional. The trial court did not have 
jurisdiction to hear the case because the matter was not certified from the juvenile court, nor did 
the direct filing statute apply. The direct filing statute, UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3A-601, grants the 
district court jurisdiction only if the minor has been previously committed to a secure facility as 
defined by statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3A-601(1)(B). Jordan was not committed to such 
a facility. 
Even if the trial court had proper jurisdiction, error during jury voir dire also requires 
reversal. A law enforcement officer was one of the State's main witnesses in this case. The trial 
court failed to remove several jurors for cause who had relationships with law enforcement 
officers. Jordan had to use his peremptory challenges to remove these potential jurors leaving 
other partial members on the actual jury. Seg State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393,398 (Utah 1994) 
(stating that failing to remove potential juror for cause is error if prejudice is demonstrated). 
Finally, the transcript in this case is riddled with omissions. There are one hundred and 
thirty-three (133) notations of "inaudible" in the fourty-eight (48) pages of the trial transcript 
dealing with voir dire. (Tr. at pp. 2-49). These omissions require reversal in that they deprive 
Jordan of the opportunity to effectively pursue an appeal. See State v. Tavlor. 664 P.2d 439, 
(Utah 1983) (holding that missing responses in the record during voir dire required a new trial). 
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ARGUMENT 
A, THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TRY JORDAN. 
The District Court did not have jurisdiction to try Jordan and should never have done so. 
Jordan was seventeen (17) when the alleged assault occurred, Jordan was not certified from the 
juvenile court under UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3A-603!, nor was the offense a serious youth offender 
offense under UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-6022. Rather, the prosecution in this case charged 
Jordan directly in the District Court (R0001). UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-601, contains the direct 
file provision and grants the district court "exclusive original jurisdiction" over juveniles sixteen 
years of age or older if the prosecutor charges murder, aggravated murder, or any felony and the 
juvenile has a prior commitment to a "secure" facility as defined in UTAH CODE ANN. §62A-7-
1
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-603(l)-(2) provides: If a criminal information filed in 
accordance with UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-502(3) alleges the commission of an act 
which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court shall 
conduct a preliminary hearing. (2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the 
burden of going forward with its case and the burden of establishing: (a) probable cause 
to believe that a crime was committed and that the defendant committed it; and (b) by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the best interests of the minor 
or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction. 
2
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-602(l) provides: Any action filed by a county 
attorney, district attorney, or attorney general charging a minor 16 years of age or older 
with a felony shall be by criminal information and filed in the juvenile court if the 
information charges any of the following offenses: (a) any felony violation of (i) Section 
76-6-103, aggravated arson; (ii) Subsection 76-5-103(l)(a), aggravated assault, involving 
intentionally causing serious bodily injury to another; (iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated 
kidnaping; (iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary; (v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated 
robbery; (vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; (vii) Section 76-10-508, 
discharge of a firearm from a vehicle; (viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated 
murder; or (ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or (b) an offense other than those 
listed in Subsection (1X&) involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a 
felony if committed by an adult, and the minor has been previously adjudicated or 
convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which also would have 
been a felony if committed by an adult. 
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101. See UTAH CODE ANN. S78-3a-601(l Va) and (b) (2000 ;^ see also State in re A.B.. 936 P.2d 
1091, 1094 (Utah App. 1997) (discussing direct file provision of juvenile offender statutes). 
UTAH CODE ANN. §62A-7-101 (18) defines a "secure facility" as "any facility operated by or 
under contract with the division [of Youth Corrections], that provides 24-hour supervision and 
confinement for youth offenders committed to the division for custody and rehabilitation." 
UTAH CODE ANN. §62A-7-101(18)(2000). 
In the present case, Jordan is a juvenile over the age of sixteen. He was also charged 
with a third degree felony. (Tr. at p. 51). However, he was not "previously committed to a 
secure facility" as required by the direct filing statute. Jordan was an inmate of the San Juan 
County Jail awaiting trial on another matter when the alleged assault occurred. (Tr. at p. 71). 
The San Juan County Jail is an adult facility and is not a "secure facility" as that term is defined 
by UTAH CODE ANN. §62A-7-101(l 8). It is not "operated under contract" with the Division of 
Youth Corrections and does not provide confinement for youth offenders "committed to the 
division for custody." Jordan was not committed to a "secure facility," nor was he previously 
committed to such a facility. Because Jordan did not meet the statutory requirement of being 
"previously committed to a secure facility," the district court did not have jurisdiction and 
should not have tried the case. 
While this issue has not been raised previously, new issues may be raised on appeal for 
the first time in cases of plain error. £ge State v. Perez. 946 P.2d 724,727-28 (Utah App. 1997). 
To establish plain error, it must be shown that 1) an error exists; 2) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and 3) the error is harmful. See M- at 728 (quoting State v. Dunn 850 
P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993)). 
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I n t h e a l t n n a f i u r s n i il illii1 i (Hiril IIIIII ' - inn iiLiiiii i i n n llllln issue n l n h n 1 n i . i l l n 
jurisdiction can be raised at any time. See State v. Perank. 858 P.2d 927,930 (Utah 1992). In 
Perank. the defendant was convicted of burglary in state court. Id Perank argued that the state 
trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him. of burglary INVHIIM IK t\as it Naln c Anna nan niid 
the offense occurred within Native American Lands. M The court found that "even though 
Pei ank pleaded g uiltj to the biii glai } charge and did not raise the issue of lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction with respect to the burglary until the probation revocation proceeding, tht 
properly before this court." Id The court concluded this part of its analysis by stating, 'the 
issue ::»f subject mat tei ji u isdiction can be i aised* it * im '//' w« ? " jy,(emphasis added) (citing 
Glasmann v. Second District Court 12 P.2d 361,363 (1932)). 
As discussed previously, an error existed. Jordan, a juvenile, was thrust into the adult 
s y s t e m : I I I K T H N in \ i iolatioii <tf s lul i i l i W h r l h t / i i |ii 
system is a 'critically important question and a juvenile must be afforded appropriate procedural 
protections when that determination is made." State in Interest of ClatterbucL 700 P.2d 1076, 
1079 (Utah 1985). Here, no determination. i\ as i nade. No certification hruriiin wa\ held imdci 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-603 to determine if the juvenile court should retain jurisdiction. 
I n d i a n v u s Minpl \ llin ,i iiViii iiiiiiiliiiii illliii JI lull i m i m in l . i i i on o l s t a t u t e a s d i s c u s s e d a b o v e . T h i s 
error should have been obvious to the trial court. 
Finally, the error was harmful. Without this error, Jordan would have been tried as a 
j u v e n i l e Mr w o u l d l i a v r b t v t t n f f o i d n f (In; I U I I U T I I O M ' ml I h e ( i n c i u l c s s s l r i n I J I I L I I a r e a b s e n t 
in the adult system, and he would not have received a prison sentence. 
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It is fundamental that a court without proper jurisdiction has no authority to enter a 
binding judgment against a defendant. That is what has occurred in this case, and as a result, 
Jordan's conviction should be reversed and he should be granted a new trial. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS JURORS FOR CAUSE 
Both the United States and Utah Constitutions guarantee the right of an accused to a trial 
by an impartial jury. Sge U.S. Constitution, Amend. VI; Utah Constitution, Art. I, sec. 12. As an 
aspect of this protection, Utah courts have found that a trial court's error in failing to remove a 
potential juror for cause is reversible error if the defendant demonstrates prejudice, VXL., shows 
that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent. See State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 398 
(Utah 1994). 
In the present case, Jordan was compelled to accept partial jurors because he had to 
exercise his peremptory challenges on jurors who should have been removed for cause. 
Potential jurors Whitehat, Bradford, Lee, and Black were challenged for cause and not 
dismissed. (Tr. at p.49). Each of these jurors had some kind of relationship with people involved 
in law enforcement (Tr. at p. 17-21,49), for example, (a) Whitehafs uncle is a law enforcement 
officer in Arizona (Tr. at p. 17-18); (b) Mr. Lee's brother apparently was some kind of law 
enforcement officer, however, it is unclear what type of officer or how close the relationship was 
because of numerous gaps in the record (Tr. at p.20); and (c) Ms. Black also had some kind of 
relationship with a law enforcement officer, but once again, it is impossible to determine the 
extent of this relationship because of the numerous gaps in the record. (Transcript, 19-20). 
These relationships raised a question of bias as one of the State's key witnesses was a law 
enforcement officer (Tr. at p.28). Witness Doug Pehrson was a corrections officer who claimed 
to have seen the victim after the alleged crime. (Tr. at p.58). The extent and nature of each of 
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these potential witnesses' partiality is impossible to determine frorr 
numerous omissions in the transcript. This issue is discussed in more detail under Argument "C" 
^ challenges to remove these jurors 
because the trial court did not remove them for cause. (Tr. at pp. 48-49). As a result of the loss 
of these peremptory challenges, Jordan had to accept a partial jury. As the court in State v. 
Baker. 935 P.2d 503, 507 (Utah 1997) stated, "\i (( fhr del< mtLiiil m Ltd i >,li< «i l!i il ihi ' b v >f 
the peremptory challenge resulted in actual prejudice, reversal would be an available and 
appropnule lemedi ' " 
Jordan suffered prejudice here because members of t^ 
Jurors Begaye, Johnson, and Palmer ended up on the jury and stated that they read the San Juan 
AVc <trJ ,HKI 1 he Hhu1 \htmtjm I \in\>rama regularly. ( IY at pp 32, 45), ' 1 he court failed to 
probe further to learn whether or not these jurors were prejudiced by reading these publicatioris 
See State v. Woollev. 810 P.2d 440,444 (Utah App. i W 11 (requiring trial judge to address 
potential bias through rehabi'i ^ so noting that 
general statement by juror that they can be fair does not generally rebut inference of bias). In 
Woolley. the court stated that the level of investigation necessary once voir dire has revealed 
potential juror bias will vary from case to case and is dependant mil Hie iiiiiioi s i espouses In III 
questions asked, gee State v. Woolley. 810 P.2d 440,445 (Utah App. 1991). The court 
emphasized ilui Iln; t, splnmlmii should mil he nieieU pio lnriii;i Id An inference of bias 
cannot be rebutted simply by a subsequent general statement by the juror that he or she can be 
fair and impartial, however, this is what happened in the present case. Potential juror Lee 
indicated that his brothn was imohni in \\\\\ entnrrrnii'nl i I ii |i I'> m Lee apparently 
indicated that he would be fair in weighing the testimony of other law enforcement officers, 
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however, we cannot be sure of this as there are numerous gaps in the record. M. The same issue 
and pro forma response occurred with potential juror Black. (Tr. at pp. 19-20). Jordan asked 
that these jurors and other be removed for cause (Tr. at p.48). Because the trial court refused to 
remove them (Tr. at p.48), Jordan had to accept a jury made up of jurors Begaye, Johnson, and 
Palmer, who were biased. (Tr. at pp.32, 45). 
In short, the trial court erred in failing to dismiss jurors for cause who should have been 
dismissed. Jordan then had to use his peremptory challenges to remove these jurors and without 
peremptory challenges left, Jordan was prejudiced by forced to accept partial jurors. This error 
also requires reversal. &££ State v. Baker. 935 P.2d 503, 507 (Utah 1997). 
C. MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW IS IMPOSSIBLE DUE TO MISSING 
PORTIONS OF THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT* 
Numerous omissions in critical portions of the trial transcript require reversal and a new 
trial in this case. In State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), the court found that inadequacies 
in the transcript of the voir dire phase of trial required a new trial. Id at 447. The court noted 
that in "43 pages of transcript, there are more than 35 notations of'inaudible' responses from 
potential jurors..." Id- at 445. The court went on to state that "approximately 10 of the 
inaudible responses either came from jurors about whose impartiality there is considerable 
question based on other responses in the record, or they relate directly to the issue of whether the 
trial judge erred in not eliciting sufficient information from jurors to permit intelligent and 
informed jury selection." Id* 
The court concluded its analysis by stating, "[w]hen faced with claims that a juror's 
responses to voir dire questions demonstrated an actual bias, this Court is not at liberty on appeal 
to assume what those answers showed when they are totally absent from the record and cannot 
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be reconstructed by agreement of the parties. Therefore, it was error for the distrii I • i ii I 11 > (ail 
der a new trial in the face of this inadequate record." Id. at 447 Numerous other 
jurisdictions require reversal *»"l •» »r\\ ' T H » b""1" | L ' " / P H ! s mil idequate to allow 
meaningful appellate review. See Shadle v. Municipality of Anchorage. 941 P.2d 904,905 
, Blasco v. State. 680 So.2d 1052 (Fla.App.1996); State v. McFarland. 287 
~ .64 rtowa 1980): Commonwealth v. Hams. V'<< N I • ~M HTM i n " 'r I'm,,, 
Of course, the mere existence of transcription errors does not always mandate a new trial. 
&& State v. Menzies. 845 I '" 2d. 220, 228 (Utah 1992). A showing of prejudice is required to 
overturn a conviction on the basis of transcription error, ill \ ifli u IMMI in \ nn ilnr cnois 1 
Menzies court found that "in order for mistakes in the transcript to prejudice Menzies' appeal, 
the error must 1«* m ni ihr- \nn ilur ml ,i IUMI nlm nlhei sat on the case or was challenged for 
cause and not dismissed." Id- at 229. 
In Jordan's case, the portion of the Transcript dealing with jury selection consists of 
approximately forty-eight (48) pn^ 1*-' Hi -•' | *| • "  ,IJI |M l , l l 0H lorty-eight (48) pages, there are 
approximately one hundred and thirty-three (133) notations of "inaudible" in the Transcrin 
at ()(j J 4k* 1 1 in vast majority of these "inaudible" responses are from prospective jurors. (Tr. at 
pp.2-49). 
Specifically, potential jurors Whitehat, Bradford, Lee, and Black were challenged for 
ca/t use ai id not < 11 s m 1 s s a I 1 11 11 (1 1. \ 1 1 he record does not show what questions were asked of 
thesejurors or what responses, if any, they provided. The transcript sin.- w •, nnh uLkl ilu trial 
court said regarding thesejurors: that their relationships with law enforcement officers "would 
not affect their abilit ; (<" '"> inipjtilul 111 this ciisi" ' (Tr jl p 18, lines 16-18) The record 
11 
does not show if these jurors were adequately questioned to make sure that they were 
rehabilitated and competent to sit on the jury. Sge State v. Cox. 826 P.2d 656,660 (Utah App. 
1992) (stating that to rebut an inference of bias the trial court must adequately probe the jurors 
potential bias); See also State v. Leleae. 993 P.2d 232,240 (Utah App. 1999) (stating that voir 
dire procedures should not qualify jurors as quickly as possible on the basis of superficial 
questions and a statement by the juror that they can be impartial, rather, trial courts must 
liberally exercise their discretion in favor of questions designed to discover bias so counsel may 
intelligently make for-cause and peremptory challenges). The transcript shows that there was a 
concern about the impartiality of these potential jurors because of their relationships with law 
enforcement officers. (Tr. at p.48). However, this Court cannot assess whether this concern was 
adequately addressed because the record is incomplete. Therefore, the Menzies standard is met 
in that the error or omission relates to jurors who were challenged for cause and not dismissed. 
Menzies> at 229. 
Menzies also provides that it is prejudicial to an appeal if the transcription error occurs in 
the voir dire of a juror who sat on the case. M. In the present case, the voir dire of jurors Maloy, 
Chee, Begaye, and Johnson is almost completely inaudible in the transcript. (Tr. at pp. 11-14). 
There is no way to determine the adequacy of the voir dire of these jurors. 
In Menzies. the court ultimately concluded that the errors in the transcript were not 
prejudicial, and that the record was adequate to provide a meaningful review on appeal. I$L at 
232-233. The court distinguished Menzies' situation from Taylor in that in Taylor the 
"omissions occurred in portions of the transcript that directly related to issues on appeal." Id- at 
232. In the present case, most of the omissions occurred in the voir dire section of the 
Transcript. Whether voir dire was proper and whether jurors were improperly kept on the panel 
12 
are Jordan's major issues on appeal. 
Because the transcription omissions occur in the voir dire of both jurors who sat on the 
case ,ii»(l noil ail i, ill! IIIIMI1. whtt vu in t lullc iip'ti lor r.i use and not dismissed, Jordan has been 
prejudiced in his appeal. Therefore, he is entitled to a reversal of his conviction and a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
I \w trial i1 mi I Jul mil II.IM |ni(i .JH him 1 "iimlaii \ »isi' IhhiMiui is fundamental 
and requires reversal Furthermore, Jordan was denied his right to an impartial jury because 
numerous jurors were not properly dismissed for cause. Finally, transcription errors deny Jordan 
his right to a meaningful appeal. Based on the lofcgoiii}* hudm iin/spalfulhi irquesh lhal (tins 
Court reverse his conviction and grant him a new trial. 
\ mi) ihiM I iSth day of October, 2000^ 
A . 
Morgan 
Grand County Public Defender 
Attorney for Defendant, Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of October, 2000,1 sent by first-class mail, postage 
prepaid, two true and correct copies of the above BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following: 
Office of the Attorney Genera*, /\ii|vn.'it»» ! "*" "M< m 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
13 
Addendum I 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Ban Juan County 
CRAIG C. HALLS #1317 
San Juan County Attorney 
P. 0. Box 850 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Phone 587-2128 
Fax No. 435-587-3119 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH * 
Plaintiff, * FINDINGS, JUDGMENT 
vs. AND COMMITMENT 
JORDAN VANCE CALLIHAM, * Criminal No. 9917-142 
Defendant(8). * 
THIS MATTER came before the Court for Sentencing on the 16TH 
day of MARCH, 2000, before the above entitled Court, Craig C. 
Halls, San Juan County Attorney, attorney for State of Utah, and 
Defendant appearing in person and with his attorney, Happy Morgan. 
The Defendant was found guilty by a Jury to ASSAULT BY A 
PRISONER, a Felony of the Third Degree Felony. 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, 
that the Defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison to serve 
a term not to exceed FIVE (5) YEARS, to be serve consecutively 
with the sentence he is already serving. 
Sheriff of San Juan County is directed to take him into 
custody and deliver him forthwith to the warden of the Utah State 
Prison. 
*"° MAR 1 6 2000 
CLfiBK OF THE COURT 
BY, 
DEPUTY 
-2-
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the original of this Judgment and 
Commitment shall be attested to by the Clerk of the Court and that 
a certified copy hereof be delivered to said Sheriff or other 
qualified officer and that copy serve as the Commitment of the 
Defendant and of the Warrant for the Sheriff in taking into 
custody, detaining, and delivering said Defendant* 
DATED: March 16, 2000 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing to HAPPY MORGAN, ATTORNEY 
FORjDEFENDANT, APP, AND A COPY TO AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON, this 
/&*** day of MARCH, 2000, by placing same postage prepaid in the 
Monticello Post Office. 
J CLERK 
